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Abstract: We present a new formal approach to the implementation of embedded systems, arrived at by 
introducing self-management capabilities to the same. We use the ASSL (Autonomic System 
Specification Language) framework to approach the problem of formal specification and automatic code 
generation of embedded systems. Some features of ASSL help to specify event-driven embedded systems 
where hardware is sensed via special metrics intended to drive events and self-management policies. The 
latter can be specified to handle critical situations in an autonomous reactive manner. Moreover, we 
present a case study where we use ASSL to specify control software for the wide-angle camera carried on 
board by NASA’s Voyager II spacecraft. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Embedded systems have taken their fair share of the 
tremendous expansion of IT in our daily lives. A most 
important feature of these systems is that they are able to 
provide a secure and highly available environment in 
conjunction with the ability to deliver deterministic real-time 
services. In addition, they often have long-life and 24x7 
operational requirements. Being closely related to 
revolutionary innovations in computer hardware, embedded 
systems have become more and more powerful. As a result, 
today, the computational tasks we can accomplish in an 
embedded environment are much more complex than those 
just ten years ago. However, in order to build reliable 
embedded systems that cope well with the increased 
complexity, we need new, modern, development approaches. 
The latter must not only overcome the complexity problem 
but also must address the quality of service (QoS) in 
embedded critical systems where it is often the main concern.  
We present our approach to this problem, whereby the ASSL 
(Autonomic System Specification Language) (Vassev, 2008; 
Vassev and Hinchey, 2009a) is used with its appropriate 
constructs to specify (or model) the event-driven behavior of 
an embedded system and subsequently to implement the 
latter via automatic code generation. ASSL is a formal 
method dedicated to autonomic computing (AC) (Murch, 
2004). AC is recognized as a potential long-term solution to 
the problem of increasing system complexity and costs of 
maintenance. The idea is that software systems must manage 
themselves automatically by controlling complexity through 
self-management based on high-level objectives. In this 
paper, we demonstrate how ASSL can be successfully used 
as a formal approach to the development of embedded 
systems, where developers will be assisted with problem 
formation, system design and system implementation. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, 
we review related work, and in Section 3, we briefly present 
the ASSL framework, the ASSL constructs suitable for the 
specification of embedded systems, and the architecture of 
the ASSL-generated embedded systems. Section 4 presents a 
case study where ASSL is used to specify the event-driven 
behavior of the wide-angle camera used in NASA’s Voyager 
II mission. Finally, Section 5 provides brief concluding 
remarks and a summary of future research and investigation 
trends. 
2. RELATED WORK: PROGRAMMING EMBEDDED 
SYSTEMS 
In general, embedded system programming is about writing 
software that drives hardware. In the past, embedded systems 
have had to run on platforms limited by memory and 
processor speeds, which in turn limited the programming 
tasks to writing simple software that drives controllers. 
However, for over 40 years, IT has obeyed Moore’s Law and,  
today, both the constant increase in processor speeds and 
decrease in memory costs allow for the development of new 
intelligent devices where real-time embedded systems 
become extremely complex in order to exploit maximum 
advantage of the chosen platform. Nowadays embedded 
system programming is targeting at applications for handheld 
devices, industrial control, set-top boxes, gaming devices, 
phones, A/V devices, and more. A subclass of embedded 
systems is real-time systems which have timing constraints 
introduced to assure the ability to make certain calculations 
or decisions in a timely manner. 
Often embedded system programming is undertaken in the 
C/C++ programming language, combined with a variety of 
techniques developed to address particular problem domains. 
For example, many embedded systems use a real-time 
operating system (RTOS) to handle concurrent execution of 
  
     
 
multiple running processes, each written in a sequential 
language such as C (Labrosse, 1998).  
Another example is the SystemC language, which is 
standardized by the IEEE (cf. IEEE 1666-2005 Standard). 
This language originated from C++ as a language for system 
modeling intended to enable ―system-to-silicon‖ design flows 
(OSCI, 2009). 
Although not considered a very efficient language due to its 
slow execution (sometimes less than 10% as fast as a similar 
program written in C), Java has also been embraced as a 
programming language for embedded systems. Key 
characteristics that helped in this are built-in multithreading 
and synchronization, automatic memory management and 
lack of pointer arithmetic. Usually, in a Java-based embedded 
system, the software runs in the host Java VM, which 
executes on top of a RTOS. Java has become popular in the 
development of networked embedded systems (Fleischmann, 
Buchenrieder, and Kress, 1999). Note that ASSL generates 
executable Java code (cf. Section 3.3).  
Formal methods have been both successful and extremely 
useful in the development of embedded safety-critical 
systems, such as modern avionics control software and 
control software for nuclear plants. Here, the advantages of 
using formal methods come from the rigorous mathematical 
semantics and the high level of abstraction provided by the 
formal notation, and from the use of software verification 
tools that help to discover design and implementation flaws 
at early stages of the software lifecycle. For example, to 
develop the control software for the C130J Hercules II, 
Lockheed Martin used a correctness-by-construct approach 
based on formal (SPARK) and semi-formal (Consortium 
Requirements Engineering) methods (Amey, 2002). 
Special formal languages called synchronous languages are 
dedicated to the programming of reactive systems 
(Halbwachs, 1993). An example of such a language is Lustre, 
which was successfully applied in the development of 
automatic control software for critical applications, e.g., the 
control software for nuclear plants and Airbus airplanes. 
Synchronous languages were also used to develop DSP chips 
for mobile phones, to design and verify DVD chips, and to 
program the fight control software of Rafale fighters 
(Benveniste et al., 2003).  
Esterel (Berry and Gonthier, 1992) is another synchronous 
language developed for specifying control-dominated 
reactive systems. This language combines the control 
constructs of an imperative software language with 
concurrency, pre-emption, and asynchronous model of time 
like that used in synchronous digital circuits.  
SDL (Ellsberger, Hogrefe, and Sarma, 1997) is a graphical 
specification language developed for modeling 
telecommunication protocols. SDL considers embedded 
systems consisting of concurrently-running finite state 
machines (FSMs) connected via channels defining messages 
they carry. In such a system, repeatedly, each FSM receives 
messages and reacts to those by changing internal state, or 
sends messages to other FSMs. 
In our approach, we propose the use of ASSL as a 
development platform for embedded systems incorporating 
self-managing features. Here, we are targeting embedded 
systems, whose Java implementation is automatically 
generated from their ASSL specification. We believe that our 
approach will help in the realization of more reliable control 
software that maximizes the utilization of the hardware 
capacity through self-adaptation. 
3. ASSL 
Although intentionally dedicated to AC, ASSL can be used 
for the development of embedded systems with self-
management capabilities. We term such systems embedded 
autonomic systems (EASs). In this section, we present the 
ASSL specification model and special features that make the 
framework suitable for the development of EASs.    
3.1   ASSL Specification Model 
ASSL is based on a specification model exposed over 
hierarchically organized formalization tiers. The ASSL 
specification model is intended to provide both infrastructure 
elements and mechanisms needed by an autonomic system 
(AS) or in this case by an EAS. Each tier of the ASSL 
specification model is intended to describe different aspects 
of the AS under consideration, such as service-level 
objectives, policies, interaction protocols, events, actions, 
etc. This helps to specify an AS at different levels of 
abstraction imposed by the ASSL tiers (cf. Table 1). 
Table 1. ASSL Multi-Tier Specification Model 
AS 
AS Service-Level 
Objectives 
AS Self-Management Policies 
AS Architecture 
AS Actions 
AS Events 
AS Metrics 
ASIP 
AS Messages 
AS Channels 
AS Functions 
AE 
AE Service-Level Objectives 
AE Self-Management Policies 
AE Friends 
AEIP 
AE Messages 
AE Channels 
AE Functions 
AE Managed Elements 
AE Recovery Protocols 
AE Behavior Models 
AE Outcomes 
AE Actions 
AE Events 
AE Metrics 
 
  
     
 
The ASSL specification model considers the ASs as being 
composed of special autonomic elements (AEs) interacting 
over interaction protocols, whose specification is distributed 
among the ASSL tiers. However, a simple EAS can be 
specified with a single AE and no inter-AE interaction 
protocols. 
Table 1 presents the multi-tier specification model of ASSL. 
As shown, it decomposes an AS in two directions:  
1) into levels of functional abstraction; 
2) into functionally related tiers (sub-tiers).  
With the first decomposition (cf. first column in Table 1), an 
AS is presented from three different perspectives, these 
depicted as three main tiers:  
The AS Tier forms a general and global AS perspective 
exposing the architecture topology, general system behavior 
rules, and global actions, events, and metrics applied to these 
rules. 
The ASIP Tier (AS interaction protocol) forms a 
communication perspective exposing a means of 
communication for the AS under consideration.  
The AE Tier forms a unit-level perspective, where an 
interacting set of the AS’s individual components is 
specified. These components are specified as AEs with their 
own behavior, which must be synchronized with the behavior 
rules from the global AS perspective. 
Here, it is important to mention that the ASSL tiers are 
intended to specify different aspects of the AS in question but 
it is not necessary to employ all of them in order to model an 
EAS. Thus, to specify a simple EAS, we need to specify a 
single AE incorporating the embedded system software 
controlling the embedded system hardware. Moreover, self-
management policies must be specified to provide self-
management behavior at the level of AS (the AS tier) and at 
the level of AE (AE tier). Note that this rule is implied by the 
fact that all the ASSL specification must be AC-driven, i.e., 
based on self-management (Murch, 2004). 
In ASSL, self-management policies are specified with special 
constructs termed fluents and mappings.  
1) A fluent is a state where an AS enters with fluent-
activating events and exits with fluent-terminating 
events. 
2) A mapping connects fluents with particular actions 
to be undertaken. 
Here, self-management policies are driven by events and 
actions determined in a deterministic manner, similar to finite 
state machines. For the purpose of EAS development, self-
management policies can be specified to control the EAS 
hardware. Moreover, real-time systems are bounded with 
deadline, where the deadline may be a particular time or time 
interval, or may be the arrival of some event. Thus, we can 
use ASSL to specify real-time EASs where different events 
can be used to trigger different policies intended to solve 
problems when the deadline cannot be met. 
In the following section, we emphasize the ASSL constructs 
suitable for the specification of EASs. A complete description 
of the ASSL specification model is beyond the scope of this 
paper. For more information, we refer the interested reader to 
(Vassev, 2008).  
3.2   ASSL Features for Embedded Systems 
ASSL implies a number of important specification constructs 
and techniques, which allow for a valuable formal approach 
to the development of embedded systems.    
3.2.1   Events 
In general, embedded systems are considered event-driven. 
ASSL exposes a rich set of techniques and constructs for 
specifying events, which makes the framework suitable for 
the specification and code generation of event-driven 
embedded systems. From the EAS development perspective, 
ASSL events are one of the most important aspects in ASSL. 
By its nature, an ASSL event is a means for high-priority 
system messaging. ASSL uses events to specify many of the 
ASSL tiers and sub-tiers, such as fluents, self-management 
policies, actions, etc. To specify ASSL events, one may use 
logical expressions over service-level objectives (SLO), 
metrics, other events, messages, etc. Here, in order to specify 
events, ASSL introduces the following clauses: 
 DEGRADED/NORMALIZED – to prompt an event when 
specified SLOs transit from normal to degraded state 
and from degraded to normal state, respectively; 
 RECEIVED/SENT – to prompt an event when an 
ASSL message has been received or sent,  
respectively; 
 CHANGED – to prompt an event when the value of a 
specific ASSL metric has been changed; 
 OCCURRED – to prompt an event when another 
ASSL event has occurred; 
 ACTIV_TIME – to prompt an event when a specific 
time has occurred; 
 PERIOD – to prompt an event regularly on period 
basis; 
 DURATION – to specify the event duration once it has 
been prompted. 
In addition, ASSL introduces a GUARDS clause to event 
specification to define conditions that must be stated before 
an event can be prompted. 
 
EVENTS {  
 EVENT lunchTime {  
  ACTIVATION { ACTIV_TIME { 12:00 AM } }  
  DURATION { 1 hour } 
 } 
 
 EVENT haveLunch {  
  GUARDS { METRICS.restaurantOpen.VALUE = true } 
  ACTIVATION { OCCURRED { EVENTS.lunchTime  } }  
  DURATION { 1 hour } 
 } 
} // EVENTS 
 
  
     
 
The ASSL code above shows a specification sample 
specifying two events. The first one (named lunchTime) is a 
timed event that will be prompted at 12:00 AM to notify the 
system that it is lunchtime. The second one (named 
haveLunch) will be prompted by the first event, but only if the 
restaurantOpen metric holds true (for more on metrics see 
Section 3.2.2). 
3.2.2   Metrics 
For an embedded system, perhaps the most important success 
factor is the ability to sense the hardware and to react to 
sensed events. Together with the rich set of events, ASSL 
imposes metrics to gather information about external and 
internal points of interest, e.g., hardware in the case of an 
EAS.   
In ASSL, metrics are control parameters and observables that 
an embedded AS can control and/or monitor (Vassev, 2008). 
Four different types of metrics are allowed: 
 resource metrics – measure managed resource 
quantities; 
 quality metrics – measure system qualities like 
performance, response time etc; 
 scalar metrics – monitor predefined dynamic AS 
variables;  
 composite metrics –  a function of other metrics. 
For the needs of embedded system development the most 
important are resource metrics. Note that the managed 
resource (cf. Section 3.2.3) in this case is the hardware 
controlled by the embedded system. In such a case, metrics 
are specified with a metric source that links the embedded 
AS with a hardware parameter that the metric in question is 
going to measure. 
 
METRICS {     
 // increments when a failed node has been discovered 
 METRIC numberOfFailedNodes {  
  METRIC_TYPE { RESOURCE }   
METRIC_SOURCE {   
 AEIP.MANAGED_ELEMENTS.STAGE_ME.countFailedNodes  } 
  DESCRIPTION { "counts failed nodes" }  
  VALUE { 0 } 
  THRESHOLD_CLASS { integer [0] } // valid only when holds 0 
 } 
} 
 
In the sample above, the metric numberOfFailedNodes gets 
updated via a special interface function called countFailedNodes 
and embedded in the specification of a STAGE_ME managed 
element. The latter represent the controlled managed 
resource, which in an EAS is the hardware. 
Moreover, metrics are specified with special range of 
acceptable values expressed with a special ASSL construct 
called threshold class. In general, a threshold class 
determines rules for valid and invalid metric values. Note that 
metrics are evaluated by ASSL as valid and invalid based on 
their metric value and can prompt events when a new value 
has been detected. Thus, if a measured value does not fit into 
the metric threshold class, it is counted as undesirable 
behavior that should be carried by the EAS in question. This 
mechanism is very useful, because we can specify metrics 
prompting events when a real-time system’s deadline cannot 
be met and the EAS in question must switch to an alternative 
execution path.  For example, the sample above specifies a 
metric, which is valid only when zero (0) holds. 
3.2.3   Managed Resource 
An AE typically controls a managed resource specified in 
ASSL in the form of managed elements (Vassev, 2008). A 
managed element is generally a functional unit, a hardware or 
software system that provides certain services. In an EAS, a 
managed element represents the controlled piece of hardware. 
An AE monitors and interacts with its managed elements. In 
ASSL, a managed element is specified with a set of special 
interface functions intended to provide control functionality 
over the same. ASSL provides an abstraction of a managed 
element through specified interface functions. Here, ASSL 
can specify and generate the interface controlling a managed 
element, but not the implementation of this interface in that 
controlled managed element. Here, when developing an EAS, 
the generated interface must be implemented by the piece of 
controlled hardware.   
Interface functions help to form a simple communication 
model for interacting with the managed elements. This model 
forms an extra layer at the AEIP (AE interaction protocol) 
(cf. Table 1). The AEIP tier is normally used to specify a 
private communication protocol used by an AE to 
communicate with:  
1) trusted AEs; 
2) controlled managed elements. 
For the EAS case, at this tier we should emphasize the 
specification of the managed element representing the 
controlled hardware.    
 
AEIP { 
 MANAGED_ELEMENTS { 
  MANAGED_ELEMENT STAGE_ME {  
         INTERFACE_FUNCTION countFailedNodes  { 
    RETURNS { integer }  
   } 
   // runs the replica of a failed node 
   INTERFACE_FUNCTION runNodeReplica {  
    PARAMETERS { NetNode node  }  
    ONERR_TRIGGERS { EVENTS.nodeReplicaFailed  } 
   } 
  } 
 }  
} // AEIP 
 
As shown by the sample above, with ASSL we specify a 
managed element as a Java-like interface, i.e., as a named 
collection of functions without implementation. The 
parameter types and the return type of those functions are 
ASSL-predefined or custom-defined types. The managed 
element interface functions can be called by the ASSL 
actions to control the managed elements. In addition, these 
can be associated with ASSL metrics (cf. Section 3.2.2) to 
retrieve information from the hardware.  
  
     
 
ASSL specifies managed element interface functions with 
four non-mandatory clauses: PARAMETERS, RETURNS, 
TRIGGERS, and ONERR_TRIGGERS (Vassev, 2008). Here, the 
TRIGGERS and ONERR_TRIGGERS clauses are used to specify 
events triggered by an interface function. For example, in the 
sample above the runNodeReplica interface function is 
specified to trigger a nodeReplicaFailed event in case of 
erroneous execution. Recall that events drive self-
management policies, which allows for handling hardware-
related events, and thus, incorporating an event-driven 
behavior into an EAS. 
3.3   ASSL Super Loop Architecture for Embedded Systems  
ASSL automatically generates an executable multithreaded 
Java application from a valid ASSL specification. Note that 
ASSL performs formal verification of the ASSL-specified 
ASs before and after generating the Java code (Vassev, 
Hinchey, and Quigley, 2009a, 2009b). Here, a valid 
specification is considered one that has passed through the 
formal verification process. 
ASSL automatically generates an executable multithreaded 
Java application from a valid ASSL specification. Note that 
ASSL performs formal verification of the ASSL-specified 
ASs before and after generating the Java code (Vassev, 
Hinchey, and Quigley, 2009a, 2009b). The basic ASSL 
verification mechanism performs exhaustive traversal to 
check for syntax and consistency errors such as type 
consistency, ambiguous definitions, etc. The same 
mechanism checks whether a specification conforms to 
special correctness properties, defined as ASSL semantic 
definitions. In addition, logical errors, such specification and 
implementation flaws, are a subject of special ASSL model 
checking mechanisms, which are still under development. 
Here, a valid specification is considered one that has passed 
through the formal verification process. 
Although considered efficient, the ASSL consistency 
checking mechanism cannot handle logical errors 
(specification flaws) and thus, it is not able to assert safety 
(e.g., freedom from deadlock) or liveness properties. Thus, a 
model checking1 validation mechanism able to handle such 
errors is under development. 
In addition to the suitable constructs allowing for the 
specification of embedded systems, ASSL also provides a 
suitable architecture for the automatically generated EASs. In 
this section, we present the architecture of the ASSL-
generated EASs.  
ASSL generates ASs with special control loops (one per 
generated AE and one global for the entire AS) intended to 
control the system’s behavior (IBM, 2006; Vassev, 2008). A 
control loop is generated to apply control rules specified and 
implemented as self-management policies, SLO (service-
                                               
1
 Model checking is a formal verification approach to automated verification 
of finite state systems by employing efficient graph-search algorithms and 
correctness properties. 
level objectives) and metrics. The following Java code 
fragment presents an ASSL-generated control loop.  
 
protected void controlLoop() { 
  try { 
//monitor-analyzer-simulator-executor 
    oMonitor.perform(); 
    oAnalyzer.perform(); 
    oSimulator.perform(); 
    oExecutor.perform(); 
 
//applies self-management policies 
    applyPolicies(); 
 
    Thread.sleep(tDelay); 
  } 
  catch ( InterruptedException ex )  
  {....} 
} 
 
As shown, a special controlLoop() method is generated to 
handle special control loop calls, and the tDelay variable is 
used to control the time  allocated per control loop execution. 
The control loop calls are as following:   
1) a perform() method is called on four distinct  
components: oMonitor, oAnalyzer, oSimulator, 
and oExecutor, to handle invalid metrics and 
degraded SLO;  
2) an applyPolicies() method is called to apply the 
self-management policies of an AE in a 
deterministic manner.    
In the first part, the control loop uses the four components to 
discover problems with both SLO and metrics, and uses 
actions to fix such problems. If there is no action set to fix a 
discovered problem, the control loop executes a generic 
action notifying about the discovered problem. The algorithm 
implemented here follows the behavior exposed by a finite 
state machine. Thus, we have a finite number of states 
(monitoring, analyzing, simulating, and executing), 
transitions between those states, and actions. The following 
elements describe the steps of the control loop algorithm 
implemented as a finite state machine. 
1) The finite state machine starts with monitoring by 
checking whether all the SLO are satisfied and all 
the metrics are valid.   
2) In case there are problematic SLO and/or metrics, 
the machine transits to the analyzing state. In this 
state, the problems are analyzed and eventually 
mapped to actions that can fix them. 
3) Next, the machine transits to the simulating state. In 
this state, for all problems still not mapped to 
actions, the system simulates problem-solving 
actions in an attempt to find needed ones. 
4) Finally, the machine transits to the executing state, 
where all the actions determined in both analyzing 
and simulating states are executed. 
In the second part of the control loop, as shown, an 
applyPolicies() method is called. The following code 
  
     
 
fragment presents the generated implementation of that 
method.       
 
protected void applayPolicies() { 
  Enumeration<ASSLPOLICY> ePolicies = 
    vPolicies.elements(); 
  ASSLPOLICY currPolicy = null; 
   
  while ( ePolicies.hasMoreElements() ) { 
    currPolicy = ePolicies.nextElement(); 
   
    //applies only "switched-on" policies 
    if ( currPolicy.isSwitchedOn() ) { 
      currPolicy.doAllMappings(); 
    } 
  } 
} 
 
Here, for each policy a doAllMappings() method is called 
where actions are called if a policy is activated by one or 
more fluents (cf. Section 3.1). 
Based on the control loop technique described above, ASSL 
generates EASs with the so-called super loop architecture 
(Kurian and Pont, 2007). The latter is a design pattern usually 
implemented as a program structure (e.g., a function) 
comprising an infinite loop that performs all the tasks of the 
embedded system in question.  
The following pseudocode presents the generic 
implementation of the super loop architecture for embedded 
systems. Note that this sample is applicable to many of the 
implementations of the super loop architecture for embedded 
systems. 
 
while (true) { 
 Task1(); 
 Delay_After_Task1(); 
 Task2(); 
 Delay_After_Task2(); 
 .... 
 TaskN(); 
 Delay_After_TaskN(); 
} 
 
As shown, the tasks are performed in a deterministic order 
with some delays between them. These delays are optional 
and are intended to keep the execution of tasks within a time 
frame allocated for each task. Here, the delays should be 
computed dynamically at runtime by considering the last 
execution time of each task for each loop pass. Note that task 
timing is important to meet the time deadlines (if such exist) 
of the system. Thus, this architecture targets at performing all 
the tasks in a correct deterministic sequential order and 
possibly in a reasonable amount of time. 
ASSL generates a control loop that executes indirectly all the 
tasks that must be performed by an ASSL-generated EAS. 
This control loop is called on a regular basis by the run() 
method of the AE specified to control the embedded system 
in question. Note that ASSL generates AEs as Java threads, 
and overrides the Java Thread class’s run() method. The 
latter is generated as following.  
 
public void run() { 
.... 
//**** runs the control loop 
 while ( !bStopAE ) {  
  controlLoop(); 
  try { 
   Thread.sleep( tControlLoopDelay ); 
  }  
  catch ( InterruptedException ex ) 
 { .... } 
 } 
} 
         
Here, the controlLoop()method is called on a regular 
basis in an endless loop and the tControlLoopDelay 
variable is used to control the overall time allocated for the 
entire AE thread.  
4. CASE STUDY: VOYAGER’S CAMERAS 
In this section, we demonstrate how the ASSL framework 
can be used to specify an EAS. Our example is an ASSL 
specification model for the NASA Voyager Mission (Vassev 
and Hinchey, 2009b). The NASA Voyager Mission (The 
Planetary Society, 2009) was designed for exploration of the 
Solar System. The original mission objectives were to 
explore the outer planets of the Solar System and as the 
Voyager I and Voyager II flew across the Solar System, they 
took pictures of planets and their satellites. The pictures taken 
by the Voyagers were transmitted to Earth via radio signals 
caring image pixels. To take pictures, Voyager II, in 
particular, carried two television cameras on board—one for 
wide-angle images and one for narrow-angle images. 
In this case study, we specified the Voyager II spacecraft and 
the antennas on Earth as AEs, which follow their encoded 
autonomic behavior to process space pictures, and 
communicate those via predefined ASSL messages. In this 
paper, we emphasize the specification of the Voyager’s wide-
angle camera, which could be considered as an EAS. For 
more information on the ASSL specification model for the 
NASA Voyager Mission, we advise the interested reader to 
refer to (Vassev and Hinchey, 2009b). 
4.1   ASSL Specification  
We specified an AE for the Voyager II spacecraft with a self-
management policy to handle the image processing behavior 
of the on-board wide-angle camera. The following ASSL 
code presents the specification of the IMAGE_PROCESSING 
policy. 
 
AESELF_MANAGEMENT { 
 OTHER_POLICIES {     
  POLICY IMAGE_PROCESSING { 
   FLUENT inTakingPicture  {  
    INITIATED_BY {  EVENTS.timeToTakePicture } 
    TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.pictureTaken } 
   } 
   FLUENT inProcessingPicturePixels  {  
  
     
 
    INITIATED_BY { EVENTS.pictureTaken  } 
    TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.pictureProcessed  } 
   } 
   MAPPING { 
    CONDITIONS { inTakingPicture } 
    DO_ACTIONS { ACTIONS.takePicture } 
   } 
   MAPPING { 
    CONDITIONS  {  inProcessingPicturePixels  } 
    DO_ACTIONS  {  ACTIONS.processPicture  } 
   } 
  } 
 } 
} // AESELF_MANAGEMENT 
 
As shown, we specified two fluents: inTakingPicture and 
inProcessingPicturePixels. The inTakingPicture fluent is initiated by a 
timeToTakePicture event and terminated by a pictureTaken event. 
This event also initiates the inProcessingPicturePixels fluent, which 
is terminated by the pictureProcessed event. Both fluents are 
mapped to the actions takePicture and processPicture respectively. 
This part of the specification is typical for any AS specified 
with ASSL, i.e., an ASSL specification is built around one or 
more self-management policies (Vassev and Hinchey, 
2009a). Therefore, in order to specify an EAS (embedded 
AS) we must specify one or more managed elements intended 
to provide the means of control over the hardware in that 
embedded system (cf. Section 3.2.3). 
 
AEIP { 
…. 
 MANAGED_ELEMENTS {  
  MANAGED_ELEMENT wideAngleCamera  {  
   INTERFACE_FUNCTION takePicture { } 
   INTERFACE_FUNCTION applyFilterBlue { } 
   INTERFACE_FUNCTION applyFilterRed { } 
   INTERFACE_FUNCTION applyFilterGreen { } 
   INTERFACE_FUNCTION getPixel { } 
   INTERFACE_FUNCTION countInterestingObjects {  
    RETURNS { integer }  
   } 
  } // ME wideAngleCamera   
  …. 
 } 
} // AEIP  
 
Here, the wideAngleCamera managed element is specified to 
control the on-board wide-angle camera via a set of interface 
functions. Through these interface functions, the 
wideAngleCamera managed element is used by the actions 
mapped to the fluents inTakingPicture and inProcessingPicturePixels to 
take pictures, apply filters, and detect interesting space 
objects. The following partial specification presents the 
doTakePicture action mapped to the inTakingPicture fluent and 
calling the takePicture interface function to ask the hardware to 
take a picture. Note that the pictureTaken event is prompted if 
the doTakePicture action is performed with no errors.  
 
ACTION  doTakePicture { // takes a picture of an interesting spot/object 
 …. 
 DOES {  
  IF AES.Voyager.isWideAngleImage THEN 
   call  AEIP.MANAGED_ELEMENTS.wideAngleCamera.takePicture; 
   …. 
  END  
 } 
 TRIGGERS { EVENTS.pictureTaken } 
} 
    
Moreover, an interestingObjects metric is specified to count all 
detected objects of interest, which the Voyager AE takes 
pictures of. The source of this metric is specified as one of 
the managed element interface functions (cf. 
countInterestingObjects); i.e., the metric gets updated by that 
interface function. The following ASSL code presents the 
specification of this metric. 
 
METRIC interestingObjects  {  
 METRIC_TYPE {  RESOURCE }   
 METRIC_SOURCE {   
  AEIP.MANAGED_ELEMENTS.wideAngleCamera.countInterestingObjects} 
 THRESHOLD_CLASS  {  integer [ 0~ )  } 
} 
 
Further, following the event-driven behavior specified for the 
EAS, we see that the timeToTakePicture event (recall that it 
activates the inTakingPicture fluent) is prompted by a change in 
this metric’s value. Here, in order to simulate this condition, 
we also activate this event every 60 seconds on a periodic 
basis. The following ASSL code sample presents the 
timeToTakePicture event specification. 
 
EVENT timeToTakePicture  { 
 ACTIVATION  {  
  CHANGED  {  METRICS.interestingObjects  } 
    OR   
  PERIOD {  60 SEC } 
  } 
} 
4.2   Test Results  
In this case study, we did not generate a separate EAS to test 
the behavior of the IMAGE_PROCESSING policy. Instead, we 
experimented with the prototype generated from the entire 
ASSL specification of the Voyager II Mission (Vassev and 
Hinchey, 2009b). Our goal was to demonstrate that the image 
processing behavior of the generated Voyager AE is capable 
of self-managing in respect of the specified with ASSL 
IMAGE_PROCESSING policy. It is important to mention, that the 
generated Voyager prototype was a pure software solution, 
and thus we could not perform real embedded-system tests, 
but simulated ones. Here, we specified metric-related events 
also as timed events, just to simulate sensing reactions from 
the wide-angle camera. For example, although the 
timeToTakePicture event was originally specified as a metric-
related one, we also specified time activation to simulate 
changes in the metric intended to receive signals from the 
camera.  
The test results demonstrated that, under simulated conditions 
(the prototype is triggered to take pictures every 60 sec), the 
run-time behavior of the controlled wide-angle camera 
strictly followed the ASSL-specified IMAGE_PROCESSING self-
management policy. Thus, the Voyager prototype took virtual 
pictures and transmitted blended images to virtual antennas 
on Earth, where these images were redirected to the virtual 
mission base for further processing (Vassev and Hinchey, 
2009b). 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have demonstrated how ASSL – a formal 
tool dedicated to AC, can be used to develop embedded 
systems with self-management capabilities. ASSL 
  
     
 
emphasizes self-management policies provided by special 
AEs intended to control special managed elements. In our 
approach, to develop embedded systems termed EAS 
(embedded autonomic systems), we use suitable ASSL 
specification structures and techniques to specify AE-level 
self-management policies that control a piece of hardware. 
This control is provided via: 
 ASSL events related to ASSL metrics, specified to 
react to changes in that hardware; 
 special managed element interface functions 
intended to get these metrics fed with data from the 
controlled hardware or to trigger events related to 
the same.   
Real-time tasks can be specified as self-management policies, 
where we can use timed ASSL events to bound tasks with 
time. Alternatively, ASSL metrics related to hardware 
activity can raise events to notify for the accomplishment of a 
particular task. Due to the fact that ASSL provides automatic 
code generation, we can generate the Java implementation of 
successfully specified EASs. An ASSL-developed EAS is 
generated as a multithreaded Java application implementing a 
special design pattern for embedded systems termed as super 
loop architecture. Here, as a proof of concept, we have 
successfully used ASSL to specify and generate an EAS that 
controls the wild-angle camera carried on board by NASA’s 
Voyager II spacecraft.  
Future work is concerned with further EAS development by 
including real pieces of hardware attached to the control 
software generated by the ASSL framework. Moreover, we 
intend to build EAS prototypes incorporating self-managing 
policies such as self-healing, self-protecting, and self-
adapting. This will help us to investigate and develop 
embedded systems able to automatically detect and fix 
performance problems, e.g., by switching to alternative 
modes of execution.  
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